From Swiss precision to startup scrappy: six classic mistakes I made as a founder

My journey began in Switzerland, a country where a conservative corporate culture and a degree of risk-aversion are pretty much ingrained. It’s a small nation, a target market comparable in population to New York City, but navigating four official languages. Reputation is critical. In a small country, integrity isn't just a “nice” value, it's a foundational element of how society functions. Public failure is generally not a celebrated outcome.

Then I moved to the Bay Area for business school, an experience that required adapting to a new mindset: thinking big, moving quickly, and becoming scrappy in an environment without established corporate support structures like legal or HR departments. It was in this dynamic setting that I met my co-founders, Tommy and Magali. Tommy had the vision for a "community of sweaty changemakers." The mechanism was straightforward: users run, log miles on our app, and each mile generates a donation to a non-profit, funded by a corporate sponsor. With my background in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), the mission appealed to me, and more importantly, I connected well with both Tommy and Magali. We embarked on this venture full of optimism, aiming to build a mission-driven company that was both financially sustainable and capable of creating a significant positive impact.

From founding the company in 2017 until leaving it last year and eventually seeing it being shut down, I made several classic founder mistakes. Here are six of them, and the lessons I’ve drawn from each.

The atlasGO Team in early 2023

Classic founder mistake #1: proceeding without a technical co-founder

While the three of us were aligned on core values (a crucial element) and possessed complementary skill sets, we lacked a technical co-founder. Someone who could actually build the product. We understood this was a potential issue. For many Angel and VC firms, the absence of a technical co-founder is an immediate disqualifier.

Our initial approach, common for non-technical teams, was to consider outsourcing. The market offers numerous firms claiming to be a "technical co-founder as a service," often proposing equity deals at reduced rates, and so on. We explored this for three months, and I can state clearly that it did not work, and I would say that it rarely can. The business model of these tech studios is generally not compatible with the needs of a startup focused on building a technical product. Their processes tend to be too slow, code consistency can suffer, and their fundamental incentives are not aligned with a startup's need for deep, integrated technical leadership. If your core product is technology-based, and no founder can build it, you are essentially project managing an expensive hypothesis.

We were fortunate to later recruit a talented CTO who committed to our journey. She accepted an equity arrangement that enabled us to offer a somewhat competitive package in the Bay Area at that time. However, this always remained a point of tension regarding compensation relative to others in the team, including the co-founders, especially as we bootstrapped for nearly two years (an experience I would not repeat either).

What I’d do differently: I would not found a company again without a co-founder who has the technical expertise, is on an equal footing, and shares the same level of commitment and risk from the outset.

Classic founder mistake #2: we did not build with a "sell" mindset

Emerging from a program centered on Social Entrepreneurship, our focus was naturally on addressing societal issues and creating positive impact. While a strong mission and a theory of change are vital, we were not sufficiently diligent on the business fundamentals. Specifically, we lacked a clear vision for the company 3-5 years ahead, framed with the structured discipline that comes from "building to sell."

It's one thing to state an ambition like becoming "a community of sweaty changemakers with millions of runners" in a deck. It is another entirely to possess a focused strategy that positions the company as an attractive acquisition, even if selling is not the immediate goal. This mindset inherently drives efficiency and value creation.

This can manifest in several ways, some of which we were pretty solid at, while others definitely should have required more attention:

• Insufficient long-term vision clarity: you can absolutely build a "lifestyle tech company" not solely focused on exponential growth. However, such a company requires conscious decisions about team, focus, and niche that align with that specific vision. Similarly, aiming for unicorn status demands a corresponding strategy and execution. We tended to operate with a "let’s see where this takes us" approach, which is not a sustainable strategy. Even a mission-driven lifestyle company benefits from being built with the rigor of a potential sale in mind, as this enhances its overall value and efficiency, irrespective of the ultimate decision to sell.

• Underestimating Monthly Recurring Revenue (MRR): for a scalable tech startup, few financial KPIs are more important than MRR. We unfortunately developed a model that generated primarily Annual Recurring Revenue (ARR). Clients were happy to use our product for significant annual campaigns and reported high satisfaction. However, this ARR model was challenging for financial and logistical planning. Relying on annual campaigns is like running a bakery that only sells festive seasonal items. Revenue is sporadic, and the sales effort is constant. Each year required renegotiation. Key personnel changes at client companies, budget cuts, or shifting priorities meant losing clients that a SaaS MRR model might have retained. We attempted a pivot to MRR, but it was late in our journey, and our product's foundation wasn't built for it, leading to client resistance.

• Diversification challenges: early diversification of lead generation and sales channels is ideal, without losing product focus. Dependence on a single channel (like the App Store, Instagram, or Amazon) is common initially, but requires robust management and contingency planning.

• Governance as a critical foundation: establishing solid legal and financial structures from the beginning is essential. This includes engaging legal counsel. While costly, well-prepared governing documents are invaluable, particularly if an acquisition opportunity arises.

• Focus on making yourself redundant: The less a company depends on any single individual, including the founder, the more valuable it becomes. This isn't about reducing effort but working intelligently. Maintain oversight, but empower the team to make decisions independently. A guiding principle I adopted: team members could bring problems to me, but they were responsible for taking the solutions back out and implementing them. Your office should not become a repository for everyone else’s challenges. Leading by example, fostering trust, and treating mistakes as learning opportunities (while not tolerating repeated errors) cultivates the right culture.

• The need for organization and structure (see also classic founder mistake #4): a clear organizational structure, defined operational processes, and diligent documentation are fundamental.

• Culture and hiring based on values: a misaligned hire can be incredibly detrimental, especially during critical phases. Clear job descriptions and documented Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are vital. A strong culture also necessitates making difficult personnel decisions quickly. We sometimes hesitated with performance improvement plans when, in a small company, the need for such a plan often signifies it’s already too late. One employee misaligned with company values or performance can significantly hinder progress. Skills can be acquired, fundamental values less so.

  
  

What I’d do differently: build and scale with an intention to sell within 3 years, even if it isn’t the ultimate goal. Make sure that long-term vision, MRR, culture, organizational structure, diversification and independence are the building blocks of value creation.

Classic founder mistake #3: insufficient focus

Pivoting is a common, often necessary, part of the startup lifecycle. The initial concept rarely remains the final product. The challenge lies in distinguishing a necessary strategic pivot from merely reacting to every client feature request.

Following our product launch and initial client pilots, the feedback was consistent: clients valued the concept of their employees running as a team for a company-sponsored cause. However, they were not interested in sponsoring external individuals as a marketing or branding exercise. Their primary interest was using the campaigns exclusively for their own employees for engagement, health, and employer branding.

This was a clear market signal, and we adapted our product to allow for "private" campaigns. Our error, however, was not committing to this pivot entirely. We maintained our "public community" aspect, which diverted focus and resources from our more promising new direction in employee health and engagement. When a pivot is decided, it should be executed comprehensively.

The COVID-19 pandemic presented another instance where focus wavered. Pre-COVID, our employee engagement programs were showing promise. When the pandemic began, our product became a "pain-killer" for two distinct groups. For corporate clients, it addressed the need for employee engagement during remote work. For non-profits, whose fundraising events were cancelled, it offered a desperately needed model for engaging donations. Again, we made the mistake of not fully committing to one direction. Non-profit clients required integrated donation capabilities, a feature not prioritized by our corporate clients. In attempting to serve both, we didn't achieve excellence in either. As a small startup, we found ourselves competing against larger companies that were singularly focused on either engaging fundraising technology or employee engagement solutions.

While I cannot definitively say how things would have evolved with a singular focus, I do know that dividing our attention meant we were not best-in-class in either segment. In the startup world, being adequate in multiple areas is often less effective than being excellent in one.

This lack of focus extended to our product pipeline. Prioritizing feature requests from corporates, non-profits, and end-users was extremely challenging. It took years to establish a genuinely clear, stringent policy for managing our product roadmap and feature funnel. Financial pressures sometimes made the dilemma even worse, as clients would occasionally make signing dependent on the inclusion of a specific feature, making it difficult to resist these pressures.

Focus is equally critical in hiring: recruiting the right individuals at the appropriate time and making decisive changes when necessary.

What I’d do differently: focus and the essential, and if a pivot is necessary do it with 100% determination (and let everything else go).

Classic founder mistake #4: ambiguity in hierarchy and structure

As co-founders, we experienced the typical challenges around roles, responsibilities, and hierarchy. Our strong emphasis on maintaining an even distribution of authority led to two issues:

1. A leadership style that often resembled a "discussion club," which lacked sufficient structure and sometimes slowed decision-making.

2. While we had defined areas of responsibility (product, marketing & sales, operations) and one co-founder held the CEO title, the co-founders did not, by design, formally report to that CEO. We aimed to keep things equitable.

   
   

Our intention was a flat hierarchy with consensus-based decisions. The outcome, however, was often inefficiency and a lack of clear accountability.

When my co-founders eventually departed and I was appointed CEO, it marked the first time the company had an unequivocally clear hierarchical structure, with one leader and direct reporting lines. This change brought noticeable improvements in efficiency and accountability. I regret that we did not implement such clarity much earlier. While co-founding offers many benefits, it is crucial to designate one CEO who establishes the structure, ensures accountability, and is, in turn, accountable to a board or similar external body.

What I’d do differently: even with multiple Co-Founders, have one CEO who is fully accountable for structure and results towards an external body (even if it’s an informal body).

Classic founder mistake #5: we didn’t recognize the end quickly (or cheaply) enough

Setting aside the profound human impact of COVID-19, from a purely business perspective, the pandemic was a critical event in our company's journey. Interestingly, I believe that without COVID, our company might have ceased operations sooner. Our financial position pre-pandemic was improving, but not extremely strong, and we had missed our annual targets.

COVID altered the landscape. Our offering shifted from a "nice-to-have" to an essential "pain-killer" for both our corporate and non-profit clients. We achieved break-even and experienced periods of regular six-figure monthly revenue. This period of intense demand lasted approximately 18 months. In retrospect, the sheer volume of work (often 60-70 hour weeks with calls spanning international time zones) and our relative inexperience in managing such rapid growth meant we couldn't fully capitalize on it. While we might have had the opportunity to raise more substantial funding during that time and scale up quicker, I am, in hindsight, almost glad that we did not, as the demand eventually receded for us and most of our competitors. The COVID phase was a bit of an anomaly, a market surge that in handsight mostly extended our operational life, while we thought it was the turning point (some of our investors even congratulated us that we’ve “made it”).

However, the most significant issue regarding not failing "quickly enough" stemmed from our idealism and personalities. We were committed to building a mission-driven company and found it difficult to accept a bottom-line driven defeat, even when evidence suggested challenges ahead. While maintained belief in our potential until my last day at the company, the financial data began to indicate a different reality. Our grit and dedication were substantial, so our commitment to the mission and, admittedly, a degree of sunk cost fallacy, kept us pushing forward. For the final 12 months, the signs were apparent: lead generation declined, some long-term clients indicated a desire for new solutions, and our new MRR-focused product did not achieve the necessary traction.

We persisted longer than perhaps we should have, driven by our attachment to the mission and to each other. However, clarity and courage in entrepreneurship also mean recognizing when it is time to stop. Not as an admission of failure, but as an acknowledgment that sufficient learning has occurred.

I dedicated seven years of my career to this startup, gaining invaluable lessons, and I would undertake the journey again. However, the personal financial implications could have been severe, considering we bootstrapped for two years and never compensated ourselves near market rates. Selling a portion of my stake once we were on a very promising growth trajectory likely brought my personal financial outcome close to break-even compared to traditional employment over those seven years. For any founder, having an opportunity to de-risk a small part of your personal financial situation is not a sign of a lack of faith or not being "all-in", but a prudent step in a long, unpredictable journey. The principle of failing quickly and accepting sunk costs is sound advice for founders, employees, and investors alike (and I remain extremely grateful to our investors for their support, even through the process of closing the business).

Mistake #6: we built a "vitamin," not a "painkiller"

In the startup world, products are often categorized as either a "painkiller" or a "vitamin." A painkiller solves an urgent, intense problem that a customer cannot ignore and is actively seeking to alleviate long-term and regularly (see MRR). Think of a software that prevents critical data loss. A vitamin, on the other hand, is a "nice-to-have." It offers benefits and improvements, but its absence doesn't cause immediate or acute pain. Our product, despite its clear benefits, was fundamentally a vitamin. We also fell victim to the "say-do gap" that often accompanies mission-driven products. Because our mission and approach was very positive and human (improving employee health and supporting non-profits) prospects were overwhelmingly positive in conversations. They praised the concept and expressed strong intent to use it. However, when they returned to their day-to-day realities, they faced more pressing "pains": budget constraints, pressure from management on core business targets, and other urgent projects. Our "nice-to-have" initiative was perpetually pushed down the priority list, sometimes for years.

Furthermore, while we came close to identifying pain points our solution could address (e.g., employee health KPIs, retention rates, and absenteeism), we found it incredibly difficult to gather the necessary data to prove a direct, quantifiable impact on a key metric that finance departments couldn't ignore. The ultimate KPI for a B2B offering is always the bottom line: hard cash saved or earned. We struggled to definitively prove that using our product would lead to specific savings in healthcare costs or a measurable reduction in turnover that would justify the expense. Without that concrete, undeniable link to a financial pain point, we remained a discretionary purchase rather than an essential one.

What I’d do differently: I would relentlessly interrogate the core problem from day one to ensure we are solving a true pain for a specific customer segment, rather than offering a solution that is merely beneficial or inspiring. That doesn’t mean mission and margin are at odds, they can (and should) reinforce each other. But without clear, immediate value at the core, even the best intentions will struggle to get prioritized.

What I would do again (because successes were achieved)

It is natural to focus on mistakes when a company eventually concludes its operations such as ours did, even after notable achievements: creating a revenue-generating product from an idea, executing thousands of engagement campaigns that raised millions for important non-profit organizations, and sharing many rewarding and lasting moments and friendships with my co-founders, our team, our clients, and investors. If a startup survives for seven years, it has undoubtedly done some things correctly.

Here are aspects I would absolutely replicate:

• Prioritize culture, values, and purpose (and B Corp Certification): I am aware that in some circles (especially within the current political and economic climate), concepts like CSR and DEI are sometimes dismissed, with the assertion that "the only reason a company should exist is to make money!" Even thought leaders I really look up to, like Scott Galloway, while advocating for "responsible leaders," operate within this sentiment. But one significant reason more leaders don't speak out on broader issues is their fiduciary responsibility to solely maximize profits. I maintain a strong conviction that companies placing values first, with a purpose extending beyond their immediate product or service, possess a competitive advantage. I am certain our startup would not have endured as long as it did without these shared values and a higher purpose. We had many dedicated employees who truly believed in our mission and committed themselves fully until the end. While I understand the critique of CSR as "virtue signaling" or a mere marketing tactic (the (RED) iPhone campaign is often cited), I believe there are fundamentally two kinds of companies: those generally perceived as "good," creating societal value, and those perceived as "bad," perhaps due to environmental damage or exploitative practices. No CSR program or corporate messaging campaign can transform Meta into Patagonia. However, for a "good" company, a sophisticated CSR program (encompassing robust employee engagement, strategic initiatives for positive global and community impact by sharing both wealth and knowledge), as well as environmental stewardship can provide a distinct advantage in attracting and retaining talent, making better products and to some extent, fostering a more positive brand perception. I would also pursue B Corp certification again without hesitation. It is an excellent program that encourages consideration of a wide array of factors in building a company: governance, employee treatment, product impact, which are beneficial regardless of the company's trajectory. I also find merit in the legal framework of the benefit corporation. While technically similar to a C Corp but with an added "impact statement," this statement can legally broaden the directors' fiduciary responsibilities beyond pure profit maximization. Perhaps this framework might empower more CEOs to address pressing social and political issues. So, yes to values as a corporate foundation, yes to a purpose that transcends the purely commercial, yes to striving for more than just profit maximization (as encouraged by B Corp certification), and yes to well-aligned, strategic CSR initiatives.

• Maintain frugality in spending: My Swiss background instills a general aversion to debt. Credit card debt was (and largely remains) viewed cautiously in Europe, we generally buy and consume what we can afford. As I was responsible for our startup's financials, I found the Silicon Valley tendency towards lavish spending on non-essential perks (massages, game tables, merchandise) quite challenging, even if partly justified by the need to attract scarce tech talent. We resisted most of these "temptations" and maintained rigorous control over non-essential expenditures. Treating investor capital with the utmost respect and a focus on efficiency is, I believe, a sound approach, more important than cultivating the "coolest" office environment.

• Lead by example and emphasize "we" over "I": while our consensus-driven approach sometimes lacked efficiency, we successfully cultivated a culture where individuals could challenge each other respectfully and acknowledge when they were mistaken. Keeping personal ego in check and maintaining focus on the larger objectives is essential.

  
  

Finally, it is profoundly important to acknowledge that, in the grand scheme, what we do in our daily professional lives is often not as critical as it feels at the moment. We invested immense effort and experienced significant stress. In hindsight, the peaks were rarely as high, nor the lows as low, as they seemed at the time. Disconnecting these fluctuations from one's personal ego and intentionally and consciously engaging with (and having fun on) the journey is where genuine insight lies. This perspective allows us to understand that while talent and hard work can certainly increase the probability of success, the significant unknown variable in the equation is always "luck." Many individuals possess more talent or work harder yet may not achieve conventional success, while others with less of these attributes may find themselves in prominent positions.

These experiences, these mistakes, have been profound teachers. If you are a first-time founder navigating these often turbulent waters, I hope that sharing my missteps might help you to avoid some of your own. If you want to exchange perspectives or simply seek a sounding board from someone who has been through these challenges, please feel free to reach out. Life and entrepreneurship is a continuous learning process for us all.